Introduction
Advocates of the \hollowing out" hypothesis argue that the increase in capital mobility would tend to make intermediate exchange rate regimes (for example, adjustable pegs, bands, or dirty°oating) disappear, in favor of the extremes of currency boards or monetary union on the one hand, and freely°exible exchange rates on the other [see Eichengreen (1994) , Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) , and Fischer (2001) The adoption of a regime would be less the result of o±cial policy than of speculators' actions. An exchange rate peg would give way to a°oating currency if the former was unsustainable as a result of over-expansionary domestic credit (as in¯rst generation models), or low growth and high unemployment (as in second generation models). In principle, the abandonment of an intermediate exchange rate regime in a crisis could also involve a move to a currency board or monetary union, though in practice this is less frequent.
A parallel and equally in°uential literature on exchange rate regime choice is derived from Mundell's seminal paper on optimum currency areas (OCA). The structural characteristics of an economy should in°uence whether a country would choose to share a common currency with another. These characteristics include, for example, the correlation (symmetry) and e®ect of shocks and the mobility of labor [Mundell (1961) ]. Other factors have also been suggested as important for the choice of exchange rate regime, such as the existence of¯scal transfers, the degree of openness, and the extent of diversi¯cation of production [see Masson and Taylor (1993) for a survey]. Though there have been numerous attempts to explain regime choice using OCA models, the variables implied by the theory have not been very successful in accounting for the observed exchange rate regimes [see, for example, Frankel and Rose (1998), Mussa et al. (2000) , and Juhn and Mauro (2001) ]. Poirson (2001) reports some success of traditional OCA variables and political factors in explaining regime choice. Masson (2001) argues that a strategy to test the hollowing out hypothesis is to look at the matrix of transition probabilities between di®erent exchange rate regimes.
1 Speci¯cally, one can test whether there are transitions away from intermediate regimes, but not towards them. This condition is both necessary and su±cient for hollowing out. Using two di®erent exchange rate regime classi¯cations, the data generally reject the hollowing out hypothesis for all time periods when all countries are included. When the sample is restricted to the decade of the 1990s for the emerging market countries only, and for only one of the two regime classi¯cations, the data cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no exits from currency boards, implying that this regime would eventually dominate. Such a conclusion contrasts with the predictions of OCA models, which imply that a degree of exchange rate°e xibility would be desirable, hence that countries would prefer an intermediate regime.
This paper estimates a Markov chain model of exchange rate regime transitions with time-varying probabilities. In particular, the transition probabilities between exchange rate regimes are speci¯ed to be nonlinear functions of the explanatory variables. and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) , who suggest reasons why developing countries do not bene¯t from exchange rate°exibility.
Markov chains are also a natural framework to test the predictive power of models that seek to explain the observed distribution of exchange rate regimes. According to currency crisis models, abandonment of pegs should be more frequent when countries with pegs experienced excessive domestic credit growth, overvalued exchange rates, or weak economic activity. According to OCA models, exchange rate regime transitions should result from changes in structural characteristics. These two models are not mutually exclusive. For example, if forced to exit from an adjustable peg, a country's authorities may then have the choice between a hard peg and a free°oat, so both currency crisis and optimum currency area criteria could be relevant. Second generation currency crisis models acknowledge that exit could be a deliberate choice of the authorities, even if provoked by speculation. Thus, a model explaining transitions between exchange rate regimes may include variables implied by both OCA (or other structural) models and currency crisis models. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 describes models exchange rate regime choice that motivate our empirical analysis. Section 3 explains the use of Markov chains to model exchange rate regime transitions. Section 4 reports empirical results and examines the ability of the estimated Markov chain model to forecast exchange rate regime transitions. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses avenues for future research.
[2] Collins (1996) and Edwards (1996)] and by \fear of°oating" [Calvo and Reinhart (2002) ]. Political economy or \fear of°oating" variables that have been suggested to in°uence regime choice include the extent of foreign currency debt and dollarization, the degree of central bank credibility, and the size of reserves. However, some of these variables are very hard to measure, while others are clearly endogenous.
First generation currency crisis models describe the process by which foreign exchange reserves are depleted by speculators [see, for example, Krugman (1979) ]. Speculators correctly anticipate that the authorities will not be able to maintain the peg. In the simplest monetary model, the peg is unsustainable because domestic credit expansion is too rapid. In more elaborate models, the peg is unsustainable because the real exchange rate is overvalued or the¯scal de¯cit is too large.
In second generation models, the authorities are assumed to decide whether to maintain a peg in the light of variables that enter their objective function. Assuming that they care about both the real economy (e.g., the rate of unemployment) and price (or exchange rate) stability, shocks to the real economy may a®ect the trade-o® between them and lead to a greater willingness to sacri¯ce price (or exchange rate) stability and hence abandon an exchange rate peg.
[3]
Currency crisis models suggest a set of largely endogenous variables as determinants of the exchange rate regime. These variables include the rate of domestic credit expansion, the¯scal de¯cit, the level of reserves, the real exchange rate, the rate of unemployment, the growth rate of GDP, and the in°ation rate. In addition, these models suggest that the degree of capital account openness should matter for the vulnerability to speculative attack.
Most models assume perfect capital mobility, but if the economy is cut o® from world capital markets, it may not be forced to abandon a peg even in the face of a fundamental disequilibrium.
Markov Chains
A Markov chain is a simple stochastic structure that can summarize the transition between exchange rate regimes. De¯ne by s t the exchange rate regime in period t: In the analysis that follows, s t is assumed to take either of three possible values: s t = 1 denotes a¯xed exchange rate regime, s t = 3 denotes a°oating exchange rate, and s t = 2 denotes an intermediate exchange rate regime. The Markov chain is de¯ned by three objects. First, the state-space set, S t ; that contains the possible values the state variable can take (in this case, 1; 2; or 3).
Second, the 3 £ 3 matrix of transition probabilities, P; with elements p ij for i; j = 1; 2; 3 : 
The typical element p ij = Pr(s t = jjs t¡1 = i) is the probability that the current regime is j given that the regime in the previous period was i: Third, the 1 £ 3 vector ¼ t that records the proportion of countries in each of the three regimes at time t: The matrix P satis¯es
That is, the elements of P add up to one across rows. The vector
The distribution of exchange rate regimes evolves over time following the law:
Iterating forward on (2) delivers the distribution at some point in the inde¯nite future :
where ¼ 0 denotes the initial distribution at time t = 0: Provided that the Markov chain is ergodic, meaning that the matrix P has a single unit eigenvalue, the long-run distribution ¼ is independent of the initial distribution and can be termed the invariant distribution.
[4]
The hypothesis of hollowing out of intermediate regimes implies that the second element of ¼ is 0. That is, the long-run distribution of exchange rate regimes is concentrated in either one or both of the tails. This is only possible, if either the¯x,°oating, or both regimes are absorbing states (i.e., p 11 = 1 and/or p 33 = 1) so that other states cannot be reached from them, or else¯xed and°oating exchange rate regimes together constitute a closed set. In this case, transitions between them can take place but not towards the intermediate regime In the above discussion, the transition probabilities in P are assumed to be constant.
However, it seems likely that economic variables could a®ect the probability of a country's transition from one exchange rate regime to another. A simple way to allow time-varying transition probabilities in Markov chains involves the nonlinear parameterization of the probabilities in terms of a set of predetermined explanatory variables. Pesaran and Ruge-Murcia (1999) follow this approach to model the realignment probability in exchange rate target zones. Variables suggested by the currency crisis and OCA literatures are natural variables to explain exchange rate regime transitions. This extension is important to examine the hollowing out hypothesis because transitions away or into intermediate exchange rate regimes might be less or more frequent depending on economic conditions.
In order to economize on notation, the function that links transition probabilities and explanatory variables is de¯ned as p ij (X t¡1 ), where X t¡1 is a m £ 1 vector of predetermined variables (including a constant) and
We adopt a functional form that imposes the constraints that the transition probability is bounded between zero and one, and that each row of the matrix P sums to one. For example for row 3 :
where¯i j is a m £ 1 vector of coe±cients. The case studied by Masson (2001) corresponds to the special case where the only element in X t¡1 is a constant term.
Notice that even if a given transition is infrequent (but nonzero) in the data, the nonlinearity of the model helps identify the coe±cients of variables that determine this transition. To see this, suppose that the transition from°oating to¯xed exchange rates is infrequent, meaning that the econometrician does not have very many observations of this transition in the data set. In terms of the above equations, one would think that the coe±cients in 31 are poorly (perhaps, not) identi¯ed. However, due to the restrictions that probabilities are bounded between zero and one, and that each row of the matrix P sums to one,¯3 1 [5] also appears in the equations that describe the transition probabilities p 32 and p 33 : If these transitions are more frequent in the data, the coe±cients in¯3 1 can be identi¯ed fully.
The Markov property of the model implies that the probability of observing a given sequence of exchange rate regimes in country k is given by:
where n ij k is the number of times that there occurs a one-period transition from state i to state j in country k: For the complete sample of K countries, the log likelihood function is constructed by taking logs on both sides of (4) for each country and summing up over k = 1; 2; : : : ; K to obtain:
where
This log likelihood function can be maximized numerically using standard procedures to obtain e±cient and consistent estimates of the model parameters.
Note that when the relation between p ij and X t¡1 is given by the logit function, this log likelihood function corresponds exactly to the one of a multinomial logit model. The parallel between discrete choice models and the Markov chain with time-varying probabilities means that one could give a structural interpretation to the model. Speci¯cally, conditional on the current exchange rate regime and a set of observable variables, X t¡1 , each country chooses whether to remain in the current regime or to switch to either of the alternative regimes.
4 Empirical Results

The Data
For the estimation of the Markov chain models, we use data on exchange rate regime classi¯-cation and four explanatory variables, namely, in°ation, trade openness, growth, and reserves between 1975 and 1997 (inclusive). Excluding missing observations, the data set contains 2430 exchange rate transitions for 168 countries. The classi¯cation of regimes was obtained from Ghosh et al. (1997) . The data for the explanatory variables was obtained from the 2 Notice, however, that we do not model the (potential) choice of X t ; even though some of the variables in this vector could be endogenous. A formal treatment of this problem would require the complete speci¯cation of the government's optimization problem [for example, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001)]. At the econometric level, the possible endogeneity of X t is addressed by including only lagged values of the variables among the regressors.
[6]
IMF International Financial Statistics. In°ation was measured by the annual percentage change in the price level. Trade openness was measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Growth was measured by the annual real growth rate of GDP. Reserves were measured by international reserves minus gold over GDP. 
Preliminary Analysis of the Data
Consider Figure 1 that plots the proportion of all countries in each exchange rate regime in each year of the sample. 
is distributed chi-square with as many degrees of freedom as the number of elements inμ:
The application of this stability test for our model yields a statistic W = 44:4: Comparing this statistic with the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square distribution with four degrees of freedom indicates that the null hypothesis that the exchange rate transition dynamics are the same before and after 1990 is strongly rejected by the data. From Table 1 , it appears that the di®erence arises from the fact that the polar regimes are more persistent (though still not absorbing) after 1990, while the intermediate exchange rate regime is less persistent.
Note that the qualitative conclusions regarding hollowing out appear robust to the sample period considered. Table 2 reports ML estimates of the Markov chain obtained using the subsamples of developed and emerging market economies under the assumption that the transition probabilities are constant. Comparing these estimates with ones of the full sample for the same period , indicates that the¯xed exchange rate regime is less persistent in the two subsamples than in the full sample. Conclusions regarding the persistence of the other regimes and the hypothesis of hollowing out are qualitatively similar to the ones reported for the full sample. In most cases one can reject the null hypothesis that the polar regimes are absorbing states. 7 Hence, there is a positive probability that a developed or emerging country in either a¯xed or a°oating exchange rate regime will exit from that regime in nite time. A country that exits one of the polar regimes is most likely to adopt an intermediate exchange rate regime. To see this, note that in the case of the developed economies, p 13 = p 31 = 0: In the case of emerging market economies, p 13 = 0 and p 31 is not statistically 7 The exception is the¯xed exchange rate regime for developed countries, for which the null hypothesis p 11 = 1 cannot be rejected at the 5 percent signi¯cance level. [9] di®erent from zero at standard levels. Since the¯xed and°oating exchange rate regimes are neither absorbing states nor form a closed set, the invariant distribution of regimes would contain a nonzero mass at the intermediate regime. The invariant distribution of regimes is reported in Panel B in Table 2 .
Since Andrews and Fair's test measures the distance between point estimates of di®erent samples, one could compare the transition dynamics of developed and emerging market economies using the Wald test described above. The Wald statistic is 2.83. Since this value is less than the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square variable with four degrees of freedom, the hypothesis that the transition dynamics are the same in both sets of countries cannot be rejected. 8 However, we will see below that the assumption of¯xed transition probabilities obscures in fact di®erent determinants of exchange rate regime transitions in developed and emerging economies.
All Countries
We now endogenize the exchange rate regime transitions using explanatory variables sug- The explanatory variables included are lagged annual in°ation, lagged openness to trade, lagged GDP growth, and lagged foreign exchange reserves over GDP. Panel A in Table 3 reports the estimates of the coe±cients on the explanatory variables for the complete sample.
Each of the variables has at least one signi¯cant coe±cient, but the coe±cient on in°ation is statistically signi¯cant in all transitions. Estimates imply that in°ation increases the probability of leaving a¯xed exchange rate regime for an intermediate regime, and of leaving an intermediate regime for a freely°oating exchange rate regime. This result re°ects the fact that¯xed and managed regimes might not be sustainable when the in°ation rate is high.
Interestingly, in°ation also increases the probability of leaving an intermediate regime for a 8 Since Andrews and Fair's test was designed to test the hypothesis of structural stability in a time series, rather than across time series, this result should be interpreted with caution and is best regarded as indicative only.
9 Results obtained when the restriction p 13 = p 31 = 0 is not imposed are basically the same as those reported below. In preliminary work we also considered adding one explanatory variable at the time with similar results to the ones reported. All these results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
[10] ¯xed exchange rate. An explanation of this result is that the¯xed and managed regimes might serve as commitment mechanisms to reduce in°ation (for example, as in Israel in 1986 and Argentina in 1991).
Trade openness decreases and low growth increases the probability of going from a¯xed to an intermediate regime, and from an intermediate to a°oating exchange rate regime.
It seems that as with high in°ation, the unpleasant consequences of low growth lead to a change in regime, whether initiated by the authorities or by private investors. Finally, a low level of international reserves/GDP increases the probability of going from an intermediate to a°oating exchange rate regime.
The null hypothesis of constant transition probabilities can be tested against the alterna- Table. However, point estimates are su±ciently apart that the Wald test of stability rejects the null hypothesis that estimates are the same in both subsamples: the statistic is W = 51:047; that is well above the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square variable with 20 degrees of freedom. Hence, the quantitative role of the variables that explain exchange rate regime transition might have changed after 1990 as capital mobility increased.
Developed vs Emerging Market Economies
Finally, we compare exchange rate regime transitions for developed and emerging market economies. Since both sets of countries face a high degree of capital mobility, it is interesting to examine whether their transition dynamics are driven by the same factors.
Estimates for developed countries are reported in Panel D in Table 3 . Empirical results indicate that low growth increases the probability of going from an intermediate to a°oating Table 3. [11] This estimated probability corresponds to the¯tted value of the model for this transition using as explanatory variables the rate of in°ation, trade openness, GDP growth, and reserves/GDP (all lagged) and the coe±cients reported in Panel D in Table 3 . The large spike for Norway in 1978 is associated with a severe recession in that year when output fell by around 4 percent on an annual basis. Notice that the transition probability rises for most 10 Notice, however, that the Wald statistic of the null hypothesis that the coe±cients in both subsamples are the same is only W = 17:25: Since, this statistic is below the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square variable with 20 degrees of freedom, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Given the small number of countries in each sample and the imprecision with which some of the coe±cients are estimated, it is possible that this result re°ects low test power.
11 Our approach di®ers from currency crisis models in that we model a larger number of transitions rather than just a crisis event. Moreover, we consider changes in o±cial exchange rate regimes, not crises de¯ned as combinations of large movements in exchange rates and large movements in foreign exchange reserves. For a survey of the literature that attempts to predict currency crises, see Berg and Pattillo (1999) . [12] countries after 1989, and in the case of Finland reaches 26 percent in the year prior to the change in regime. For the other countries the predicted probability for this transition rises to between 4 and 12 percent.
The model is not successful in predicting the exchange rate regime transitions in South East Asia in 1997 and in Mexico in the early 1990s. 12 The estimated transition probabilities for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea are plotted in Figure 5 . Note that they do not change much in the year(s) prior to the crisis and in all cases are below 3 percent in 1996.
In the case of Mexico (see Figure 6 ), the transition probability does increase somewhat prior to the transition, but is not very high by historical levels and reaches only roughly 5 percent in the year prior to the transition. There are two possible explanations for this result. First, annual data are likely to be too coarse to explain speculative attacks that take place in a matter of weeks. Second, as suggested by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001), current fundamentals might not be able to account for the Asian currency crisis if they were the result of future expected (as opposed to current) in°ation.
Finally, Figure 7 plots the probability of a transition from an intermediate to a¯xed
exchange rate regime in Argentina in 1991. Since in°ation is an important explanatory variable for this transition in emerging market economies, the transition probability rises after 1988 to reach roughly 30 percent in the year prior to the transition.
Conclusions
Results suggest that a fruitful way of obtaining some understanding of the distribution of exchange rate regimes is to try to explain transitions between regimes. Currency crisis models and the optimum currency area literature both imply that particular variables should help explain transitions. Estimates con¯rm that these variables have signi¯cant explanatory power, but case studies indicate that they do not always have a good forecasting power.
When the sample includes all countries, high in°ation, and to a lesser extent low growth and low trade openness, tend to increase exits from the prevailing regime. This is consistent with currency crisis models (when considering the exits from intermediate or¯xed regimes), but also with the voluntary use of¯xed or quasi-¯xed rates in exchange-rate-based stabilizations.
In contrast, the level of reserves seems to have a less systematic impact. Reserves are signi¯cant in explaining transitions only for emerging market countries. This suggests that capital mobility may be lower for these economies than for the developed countries (that may have access to international capital markets even in a crisis).
12 For these cases, we use the coe±cients for emerging market countries reported in Panel E in Table 3 .
[13]
What do these results have to say about hollowing out? Estimates suggest that low in°ation and sustained growth may be the key to making intermediate (and other) regimes sustainable. To the extent that in°ation decreases in emerging market economies (as it has done in many of them), and growth can be maintained, such regimes as soft pegs may be able to resist speculative attacks. It is in bad times, measured by both variables, that regimes are especially vulnerable.
We have been unable to get a proxy for capital mobility for a su±cient number of countries to include it as an explanatory variable. However, to the extent that increasing capital mobility makes emerging market economies resemble the advanced countries in our sample, the level of reserves should become less important as a determinant for exchange rate regime transitions.
[14] [15] Notes: see notes to Table 1 . N is the number of observations.
[16] 
